Audited ·Last updated 28 Jul 2026·7 citations·Tier 1·0 uses

Password Entropy Calculator

Entropy in bits and the key space of a randomly generated password or passphrase, from any alphabet, with every constant sourced to NIST, EFF or an RFC.

Password Entropy Calculator

What do you want to work out?
Alphabet the generator draws from
Only used when the alphabet above is set to Custom. Count distinct symbols — a 5,000-word wordlist is 5,000, a 32-character Base32 alphabet is 32.
Only used when solving for entropy. For a wordlist alphabet this is the number of words, not the number of letters.
Only used when solving for length. 128 is the level NIST lists as a standard cryptographic security strength; there is no NIST rule that says a password must reach it.
Entropy
104.8734
L × log₂(C) — the min-entropy of a secret of L symbols drawn uniformly at random from an alphabet of C symbols. Valid only for a random generator, never for a password a person invented.
Bits per character or word
6.5546
Length used
16
Alphabet size
94
Key space (mantissa)
3.7157
Key space (power of 10)
31
What this figure does and does not mean
104.9 bits is at or above 80 but below 112, the lowest security strength NIST still approves for new cryptographic keys. That comparison is to cryptographic key strengths, not to a password policy. The figure describes a secret of 16 symbols generated uniformly at random from 94 printable ASCII characters (no space) — it says nothing about a password a person chose, and it is not a verdict that any particular password is safe.

Background.

This calculator answers one narrow question precisely: if a machine picked every character or word of a secret uniformly at random from a stated alphabet, how many bits of entropy does that secret carry, and how many distinct secrets could the generator have produced? It reports the entropy in bits, the bits contributed by each symbol, and the full key space split into a mantissa and a power of ten so that even a 10^6144 key space stays exact.

The arithmetic is short and worth understanding rather than trusting. NIST defines min-entropy as −log₂(max pᵢ) over a discrete distribution. When a generator draws L symbols independently and uniformly from a pool of C symbols, every one of the C^L possible outcomes is equally likely, so the largest probability is 1 ÷ C^L and the min-entropy is log₂(C^L), which is L × log₂(C). Under a uniform distribution min-entropy and Shannon entropy are the same number, which is precisely why that expression stops being valid the moment the distribution stops being uniform.

That caveat is not a footnote, it is the whole boundary of this page. Entropy measures a generator, not a string. Two passwords can look equally scrambled and have wildly different guessing difficulty, because the number that matters is how the secret was produced, not how it reads. NIST SP 800-63B-4 makes the point in its own appendix on password strength: the effective strength of user-chosen passwords has often been characterised using entropy, but estimating entropy for a human's choice is a different and much harder problem, and the guideline therefore moves to an approach based primarily on length. This calculator will happily accept the length and alphabet of a password you invented and hand you a number — and that number will be an overestimate, quite possibly by a factor of a trillion, because you did not choose uniformly. Nothing on this page is a verdict that a specific password is safe, and the result text says so every time it renders.

The alphabets are not rounded-off folklore. RFC 20, the standard that defines US-ASCII, places the graphic characters at code points 0x20 to 0x7E inclusive and lists SPACE inside that set, which gives 95 printable characters, or 94 once you drop the space bar — the alphabet a US keyboard produces and the pool most password generators default to. RFC 4648 defines the 64-character base64 alphabet. The passphrase options come from the Electronic Frontier Foundation's published wordlists: the long list holds 7,776 words, which is 6⁵ and therefore five dice rolls per word, and the two short lists hold 1,296 words each, which is 6⁴. EFF states 12.9 bits per word for the long list and 10.3 for the short ones, and this calculator reproduces both figures exactly from the list sizes — a useful confirmation that the constants are right rather than merely plausible.

The second mode runs the calculation backwards. Give it a bit target and it returns the shortest secret that reaches or exceeds that target, computed as the ceiling of the target divided by the bits per symbol, along with the entropy actually achieved rather than the entropy requested. Twenty printable-ASCII characters do not have 128 bits of entropy; they have 131.09, and the difference matters when you are writing a policy that has to survive an audit. That mode is also the fastest way to see how badly a small alphabet punishes you: 128 bits takes 20 printable-ASCII characters, 32 hexadecimal characters, 39 decimal digits, or 10 words from the EFF long list.

Below the widget you will find the derivation from NIST's own definition of min-entropy, a worked example computing 94¹⁶ exactly by repeated squaring, an explanation of why length beats character-class rules, and an honest account of the several ways an entropy figure can be wrong in the real world — reused wordlists, seeded generators, capped password fields, and the simple fact that most people do not use a generator at all.

What is password entropy calculator?

Password entropy is a measure of how much work an attacker must do to guess a secret by exhaustive search, expressed in bits. One bit doubles the work. A secret with 60 bits of entropy sits somewhere in a space of 2⁶⁰ ≈ 1.15 × 10¹⁸ equally likely possibilities; adding one bit makes it 2⁶¹. The figure is a property of the process that produced the secret, not of the characters in it. If a generator drew every symbol independently and uniformly from an alphabet of C symbols and produced L of them, the entropy is exactly L × log₂(C) bits and the key space is exactly C^L. NIST's own definition, in the CSRC glossary entry for min-entropy, is −log₂ of the largest probability in the distribution, which for a uniform draw over C^L outcomes is log₂(C^L). Entropy and key space are the same statement written on two scales: key space is the raw count of possibilities, entropy is its base-2 logarithm. Bits are the more useful unit because they are additive — a 12-character password from a 94-character pool has 78.7 bits, and appending four more characters adds 4 × 6.55 = 26.2 more. What entropy is not is a score for a password a human chose. Human choice is not uniform: people pick real words, dates, keyboard walks, and predictable substitutions, so the effective distribution is enormously concentrated and the true guessing difficulty is far below L × log₂(C). That is why NIST SP 800-63B-4 abandoned entropy as the basis for password policy in favour of a length requirement backed by blocklists of known-compromised passwords.

How to use this calculator.

  1. Choose whether you are solving for entropy (you know the length) or for length (you know the bit target you need to hit).
  2. Pick the alphabet the generator was actually configured with. If your password manager was set to letters and digits only, choose 62 — not 94, and not 95. Selecting a larger pool than the generator could reach inflates the answer, and nothing in the arithmetic can detect that.
  3. For a passphrase, choose one of the EFF wordlists and enter the number of WORDS, not the number of letters. Six words from the 7,776-word list is 6, not 34.
  4. If your generator uses an alphabet that is not listed — a 32-character Base32 set, a 5,000-word custom wordlist, a 58-character Base58 set — choose Custom and enter the number of distinct symbols.
  5. In entropy mode, enter the length and read the bits. In length mode, enter the bit target and read the length the calculator returns, plus the entropy that length actually achieves (which will be at or slightly above your target, never below it).
  6. Read the note underneath the result. It places the figure against NIST's published security-strength set and restates the one condition under which the whole calculation is valid: the secret was generated uniformly at random. If you typed in the shape of a password you invented, treat the number as an upper bound you will never reach.

The formula.

H = L · log₂(C) K = C^L L = ⌈ B ÷ log₂(C) ⌉

Start from NIST's definition rather than from the formula. The CSRC glossary defines min-entropy as −log₂(max pᵢ) for a discrete distribution p₁ … p_k: the largest value m such that every observation of the variable yields at least m bits of information. It is a worst-case measure, which is what you want when reasoning about an attacker who guesses the most likely candidate first.

Now apply it. A generator that draws L symbols independently and uniformly from a pool of C symbols can produce C^L distinct outputs, and by construction each is equally likely, so every probability in the distribution is 1 ÷ C^L and the largest of them is also 1 ÷ C^L. Substituting: H∞ = −log₂(1 ÷ C^L) = log₂(C^L) = L × log₂(C). Because the distribution is uniform, Shannon entropy gives the identical answer; the two measures only diverge once some outcomes are more likely than others, which is exactly the situation a human-chosen password creates.

The key space K = C^L is the same quantity before the logarithm. This calculator computes it in arbitrary precision and reports it as a mantissa and a power of ten, because the numbers get large fast: 94¹⁶ is a 32-digit integer, and the maximum this page will model, a 1,024-symbol secret from a million-symbol alphabet, is 10^6144 — a value no IEEE 754 double can hold, which is why the raw count is never returned as a single number.

Two structural consequences fall straight out of the formula. First, entropy is linear in length and only logarithmic in alphabet size, so length is a far more efficient lever: going from 26 to 52 characters buys one extra bit per symbol, while adding one more symbol buys 4.7. Second, entropy is additive across independent draws, which is what makes passphrases work. Each word from the EFF long list contributes log₂(7776) = 12.9248 bits, so six words give 77.55 bits regardless of how many letters they happen to spell.

The inverse mode inverts the same expression. Solving L × log₂(C) ≥ B for the smallest whole L gives L = ⌈B ÷ log₂(C)⌉, and the calculator reports the entropy that L actually delivers rather than echoing B back, because the two are equal only when log₂(C) divides B exactly — as it does for hexadecimal, where log₂(16) = 4 and 128 bits lands on precisely 32 characters.

One precision note. Bits per symbol is computed as ln(C) ÷ ln(2) in arbitrary-precision decimal and rounded once at the end, so log₂(7776) returns 12.9248125036 rather than a floating-point approximation of it. The key space is computed as an exact integer power wherever the integer has fewer digits than the working precision — 94¹⁶ comes back as 37,157,429,083,410,091,685,945,089,785,856, digit for digit.

A worked example.

Example

A password manager is asked for a 16-character password using the full printable ASCII set minus the space — the 94-character alphabet a US keyboard produces. Bits per character is log₂(94). Working in base 10: log₁₀(94) = 1.9731278536 and log₁₀(2) = 0.3010299957, so log₂(94) = 1.9731278536 ÷ 0.3010299957 = 6.5545888517. Sixteen characters therefore carry 16 × 6.5545888517 = 104.8734216268 bits, which the calculator reports as the primary result. The key space is 94¹⁶, and it is worth computing by hand once because it is easy to do by repeated squaring: 94² = 8,836; 94⁴ = 8,836² = 78,074,896; 94⁸ = 78,074,896² = 6,095,689,385,410,816; and 94¹⁶ is that number squared, which works out to 37,157,429,083,410,091,685,945,089,785,856. The calculator reports it as a mantissa of 3.7157429083 and an exponent of 31 — that is, about 3.72 × 10³¹ distinct passwords, a 32-digit number. Cross-check the exponent independently: 16 × log₁₀(94) = 31.5700456576, and 10^0.5700456576 = 3.7157, so 3.7157 × 10³¹ ✓. Read against NIST's published security-strength set, 104.9 bits sits above 80 — the level NIST's glossary records as no longer sufficiently secure for cryptographic keys — but below 112, the lowest strength NIST still approves for new keys. Adding four more characters would take it to 131.09 bits and clear 128. Every word of that conclusion depends on one assumption: that the manager's generator really did draw all 16 characters uniformly from all 94 symbols. Type in the shape of a password you made up yourself and the same 104.87 appears, and it will be wrong by an enormous margin.

secret Length16
poolascii-94
custom Pool Size100
solve Forentropy
target Bits128

Frequently asked questions.

Does this tell me whether my password is strong?
No, and it cannot. It tells you the entropy of a secret that was generated uniformly at random with the length and alphabet you entered. If you invented the password yourself, your choice was not uniform — people gravitate to real words, names, dates, keyboard patterns and predictable substitutions such as replacing 'a' with '@' — so the true guessing difficulty is far below the figure shown, often by many orders of magnitude. The honest use of this page is to size a generator or a policy, not to grade a password you already have. If you want to know whether a specific password is compromised, the right check is a breach-corpus lookup, which is what NIST SP 800-63B-4 requires verifiers to do.
Why did NIST stop using entropy in its password guidance?
Because it does not work for human-chosen secrets. NIST SP 800-63B-4's appendix on password strength says outright that entropy has often been used to characterise user-chosen passwords, but that estimating it for a human's choice is problematic, and it presents 'a different and somewhat more straightforward approach based primarily on password length' instead. Entropy is computable when the distribution is known and deterministic; a person's choice has no such distribution. The current guideline therefore sets a length floor — 15 characters for a password used as a single factor, 8 inside multi-factor authentication — bans composition rules outright, and leans on blocklists of known-compromised passwords rather than on an entropy score.
How many bits of entropy is enough?
There is no NIST number for passwords, and anyone quoting one is quoting a convention rather than a standard. What NIST does publish is a set of security strengths for cryptographic keys — 80, 112, 128, 192 and 256 bits — with 80 explicitly recorded as no longer sufficiently secure and 112 the lowest still approved for new keys. Those are key strengths, not password policy, and this page's result text says so. The practical answer depends entirely on the attack the secret has to survive: a secret that only ever faces a rate-limited online login is bounded by attempts rather than by entropy, while one protecting a stolen password hash faces billions of guesses per second. That second case is what the crack-time calculator models.
How many random characters do I need for 128 bits?
Switch the first dropdown to 'Length' and it will tell you for any alphabet. From the 94-character printable ASCII set you need 20 characters, which actually deliver 131.09 bits. From a 62-character letters-and-digits set you need 22. From hexadecimal you need exactly 32, because log₂(16) = 4 divides 128 evenly. From decimal digits alone you need 39. From the EFF long wordlist you need 10 words. Note that the calculator always reports the entropy the rounded-up length actually achieves rather than echoing your target back, because those two numbers are equal only when the bits per symbol divide the target exactly.
Is a passphrase really as strong as a random string?
It depends only on how many words and how large the list is, because entropy is additive across independent draws. Each word from EFF's 7,776-word long list contributes log₂(7776) = 12.9248 bits, so six words is 77.55 bits and ten words is 129.25 bits. A 20-character printable-ASCII password is 131.09 bits, so a ten-word EFF passphrase is very slightly weaker and vastly easier to type and remember. The critical condition is the same as everywhere else on this page: the words must be selected by dice or by a generator, not chosen by you. A phrase you thought of yourself is not six independent draws from 7,776 options, it is one draw from the far smaller set of phrases a person would think of.
What is the difference between entropy and key space?
They are the same fact on two scales. Key space is the raw count of secrets the generator could produce, C^L. Entropy is its base-2 logarithm, L × log₂(C). Bits are more convenient because they are additive and human-sized: it is easier to say '104.9 bits' than '37,157,429,083,410,091,685,945,089,785,856 possibilities', and easier still to reason that adding four characters adds 26.2 bits than to reason that it multiplies the key space by 78 million. This page reports both, with the key space split into a mantissa and a power of ten so that very large values stay exact rather than overflowing.
Why is the printable ASCII pool 94 rather than 95, 96 or 100?
RFC 20 — the IETF standard that defines US-ASCII, now Internet Standard 80 — places the graphic characters at code points 0x20 through 0x7E inclusive, which is 95 code points, and lists SPACE at 0x20 inside that graphic set. Excluding the space bar leaves 94: 26 lowercase letters, 26 uppercase, 10 digits and 32 punctuation and symbol characters. Both options are offered here because generators differ on whether they emit spaces, and some systems strip a leading or trailing space on submission, which silently reduces the alphabet a password field can actually store. There is no ASCII alphabet of 96 or 100 printable characters; figures like that come from counting control codes or from adding non-ASCII symbols a login form may not accept.
Does adding one symbol to my password really help?
Far less than adding one character. Entropy is linear in length and only logarithmic in alphabet size. Expanding a 26-letter alphabet to 52 by allowing capitals adds exactly one bit per character; expanding 52 to 94 by allowing digits and punctuation adds about 0.85 bits per character. Adding one more character to a 26-letter password adds 4.70 bits, and to a 94-character-alphabet password adds 6.55. This is the arithmetic behind NIST SP 800-63B-4's instruction that composition rules 'SHALL NOT be imposed': they buy very little entropy while pushing people towards predictable patterns such as capitalising the first letter and appending '1!'.
Does hashing or salting change a password's entropy?
No. Entropy is a property of how the secret was generated, so hashing it, salting it or stretching it with a key derivation function leaves the entropy untouched. What those measures change is the cost of testing one guess, which is a separate multiplier in the attacker's total work. A 60-bit secret stored as an unsalted MD5 hash and the same secret stored as bcrypt have identical entropy and wildly different real-world exposure, because the attacker's guess rate differs by roughly eight orders of magnitude. Entropy and guess rate multiply together to give time-to-crack, and this page deliberately reports only the first of the two.
Why does the calculator refuse some inputs?
It rejects an alphabet smaller than two symbols, because with a single symbol there is nothing to choose and the entropy is zero rather than merely small. It rejects fractional lengths and fractional alphabet sizes, since both count discrete things. It caps the modelled secret at 1,024 symbols and a custom alphabet at 1,000,000 symbols, which are bounds far beyond any real password field — NIST SP 800-63B-4 only asks verifiers to permit at least 64 characters — and it caps the inverse-mode target at 4,096 bits. Those ceilings exist so the arbitrary-precision key space stays a computation rather than a denial of service.

References& sources.

  1. [1]NIST, Computer Security Resource Center Glossary — 'min-entropy'. Definition used to derive this page's formula: min-entropy is −log₂(max pᵢ) over a discrete distribution p₁ … p_k, 'the largest value m having the property that each observation of X provides at least m bits of information'. Sourced by NIST to SP 800-90A Rev. 1, SP 800-90B, SP 800-133 Rev. 2 and NIST IR 8427. For a uniform draw over C^L outcomes this yields L × log₂(C).
  2. [2]NIST SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines, Appendix A 'Strength of Passwords'. Source of this page's scope limit: entropy has often been used to characterise the effective strength of user-chosen passwords, but estimating it for a human's choice is problematic, so the guideline presents 'a different and somewhat more straightforward approach based primarily on password length'.
  3. [3]NIST SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management, §3.1.1.1–3.1.1.2. Source of the length and composition rules quoted on this page: passwords used as a single factor SHALL be a minimum of 15 characters; passwords inside multi-factor authentication SHALL be a minimum of eight; verifiers SHOULD permit a maximum length of at least 64 characters; 'Other composition requirements for passwords SHALL NOT be imposed'.
  4. [4]NIST, Computer Security Resource Center Glossary — 'security strength'. Source of the bands used in the result note: security strength is 'a number associated with the amount of work (i.e., the number of operations) that is required to break a cryptographic algorithm', measured in bits, commonly {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}, with roughly 2^S operations required at strength S and 80 bits recorded as no longer sufficiently secure.
  5. [5]Electronic Frontier Foundation (2016). 'Deep Dive: EFF's New Wordlists for Random Passphrases'. Source of the passphrase alphabet sizes: the long list is '7,776 words (6⁵)' at '12.9 bits' per word, and the two short lists are '1,296 words (6⁴)' at '10.3 bits/word'. Both published bit figures are reproduced exactly by this calculator from the list sizes alone.
  6. [6]IETF RFC 20 (Internet Standard 80), 'ASCII format for Network Interchange'. Source of the printable-character counts: the graphic characters occupy code points 0x20 through 0x7E inclusive, with '2/0 SP Space (Normally Non-Printing)' listed inside the graphic set — 95 printable characters in total, or 94 excluding SPACE.
  7. [7]IETF RFC 4648, 'The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings', §4. Source of the 64-symbol base64 alphabet offered as a pool option.

In this category

Embed

Quanta Pro

Paid features are coming later.

  • All 590 calculators remain free
  • No billing is enabled
Coming soon